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ABSTRACT
One problem facing players of competitive games is negative, or
toxic, behavior. League of Legends, the largest eSport game, uses
a crowdsourcing platform called the Tribunal to judge whether a
reported toxic player should be punished or not. The Tribunal is a
two stage system requiring reports from those players that directly
observe toxic behavior, and human experts that review aggregated
reports. While this system has successfully dealt with the vague
nature of toxic behavior by majority rules based on many votes, it
naturally requires tremendous cost, time, and human efforts.
In this paper, we propose a supervised learning approach for
predicting crowdsourced decisions on toxic behavior with large-
scale labeled data collections; over 10 million user reports involved
in 1.46 million toxic players and corresponding crowdsourced de-
cisions. Our result shows good performance in detecting over-
whelmingly majority cases and predicting crowdsourced decisions
on them. We demonstrate good portability of our classifier across
regions. Finally, we estimate the practical implications of our ap-
proach, potential cost savings and victim protection.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.2 [Computers and Society]: Social Issues—Abuse and crime
involving computers; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and
Behavioral Sciences—Sociology, Psychology
Keywords
League of Legends; online video games; toxic behavior; crowd-
sourcing; machine learning
0. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“STFU NOOB!” If you’ve played an online video game, there’s
a good chance you’ve heard this before. Toxic behavior is a part of
life in the world of modern mulitiplayer games, but does it have to
be? Do gamers need to be subjected to beratement for every little
mistake? If another player doesn’t get his way, do his teammates
have to sit and watch them actively try to sabotage the rest of the
game? If someone consistently exhibits this type of behavior, does
the entire community just have to suffer?
As gaming has grown from simple two player games like PONG
to a multi-billion dollar, so too has toxic behavior become more
severe. Toxic behavior poses a large threat to the gaming industry.
Estimates put griefing as the cause of about 25% of calls to cus-
tomer support lines. Not only is this a huge cost to game operators,
but, it demonstrates the kind of damage that toxic players can cause.
The stress caused by harassment and other forms of toxic behavior
can cause players to become fatigued to the point that they quit the
game. With the advent of the free-to-play business model, where
the game is given away for free and the developers are supported
via micro-transactions, a game’s sustainability is directly related
to the strength of its community. A large, healthy community at-
tracts new players and keeps existing players engaged and willing
to spend money. Left unchecked, toxic behavior threatens to tear a
game’s community apart.
There have been many attempts to deal with toxic behavior. The
earliest required direct human intervention, usually from a game
master/administrator. While accurate and decisive, this type of sys-
tem doesn’t scale when there are 10s of millions of active players.
More recently, crowdsourced systems, which make use of the input
of many humans, have arisen. For example, the Overwatch sys-
tem uses expert input to detect cheaters in Counter-Strike: Global
Offensive.
Another example is the League of Legends Tribunal, which al-
lows people to vote on whether an accused player is toxic. While
Overwatch deals with a somewhat black-and-white decision, the
Tribunal deals with a more nebulously defined set of behaviors.
Maybe the player that appears to be deliberately rushing in and dy-
ing just needs to “git gud.” Maybe the player lashing out in chat just
had a bad day and would normally never act like that. The Tribunal
collects multiple instances of potentially toxic behavior, collected
from reports by players that actually experienced the behavior, and
presents them to a panel of reviewers recruited from the commu-
nity who cast votes for guilt or innocence. The Tribunal has been
deemed a success with claims that it results in reduced recidivism.
But, it still requires significant human effort, and it is slow by na-
ture: a number of reports must be received before cases are even
presented to reviewers.
In this paper, we analyze reports from several million League of
Legends matches and their corresponding crowdsourced decisions
from the Tribunal. We find that Tribunal reviewers base their de-
cisions on in-game performance of both the accused and the other
players in the game, chat logs, and the information provided by in-
game reports. We then use machine learning techniques to build a
model for detecting toxic behavior that successfully discriminates
between guilty and innocent behavior about 80% of the time, and
between overwhelming agreement on innocence about 88% of the
time.
Our findings have broad impact. There is an obvious contribution
to the gaming industry, but, we also provide a deeper understanding
of toxic behavior. We show that, at least in certain scenarios, com-
puters can be used to help find bad behavior. Our experimentally
derived model hints at the possibility for automatic detection of, for
example, cyber bullying. Ultimately, we demonstrate that machine
learning, with a little help from the crowd, can tell if you are being
toxic or just need to git gud.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Bad behavior on the Internet, or toxic disinhibition [36], is a
growing concern. The anonymity afforded by, and ubiquity of, on-
line interactions has coincided with an alarming amount of bad be-
havior. Computer-mediated-communication (CMC), without pres-
ence of face-to-face communication, naturally leads to hostility and
aggressiveness [16]. In multi-player gaming, one of the most pop-
ular online activities, bad behavior is already pervasive. Over the
past two decades, multi-player games have evolved past simple
games like PONG, growing so popular as to spawn an “eSports”
industry with professional players competing for millions of dol-
lars in prize money. Competition has been considered a good game
design element for enjoyment, but at the same time, it leads to intra-
and inter-group conflicts and naturally leads to aggressive, bad be-
havior.
Usually, bad behavior in multi-player games is called toxic be-
cause numerous players can be exposed to such behavior via games’
reliance on player interactions and the damage it does to the com-
munity. The impact of toxic players is problematic to the gaming
industry. For instance, a quarter of customer support calls to online
game companies are complaints about toxic players [8]. However,
sometimes the boundary of toxic playing is unclear [7, 10, 23, 27]
because the expected behavior, customs, rules, or ethics are differ-
ent across games [41]. Across individuals, the perception of this
grief inducing behavior is unique. Subjective perception of toxic
playing makes toxic players themselves sometimes fail to recog-
nize their behavior as toxic [23]. This inherently vague nature of
toxic behavior opens research challenges to define, detect, and pre-
vent toxic behavior in scalable manner.
A prevalent solution for dealing with toxicity is to allow report-
ing of badly behaving players, taking action once a certain thresh-
old of reports is met. Unfortunately, such systems have flaws, both
in practice and, perhaps more importantly, their perceived effec-
tiveness by the player base. For example, Dota 2, a popular multi-
player developed by Valve, has a report system for abusive com-
munication that automatically “mutes” players for a given period
of time. While the Dota 2 developers claim this has resulted in a
significant drop in toxic communication, players report a different
experience: not only does abusive communication still occur, but
the report system is ironically used to grief innocent players123.
Riot Games, which operates one of the most popular competitive
games, called League of Legends (LoL), introduced the Tribunal in
May 2011. As its name indicates, it uses the wisdom of crowds
to judge guilt and innocence of players accused of toxic behavior;
accused toxic players are put on trial with human jurors instead of
automatically being punished. While this system has successfully
dealt with the vague nature of toxic behavior by majority rule based
on many votes, it naturally requires tremendous cost, time, and hu-
man efforts. Thus, our challenge lies in determining whether or not
we can assist the Tribunal by machine learning. Although toxic be-
havior has been known as hard to define, we have a huge volume
of labeled data.
In this paper, we explore toxic behavior using supervised learn-
ing techniques. We collect over 10 million user reports involved
in 1.46 million toxic players and corresponding crowdsourced de-
cisions. We extract 534 features from in-game performance, user
reports, and chats. We use a Random Forest classifier for crowd-
sourced decision prediction. Our results show good performance
in detecting overwhelmingly majority cases and predicting crowd-
1http://tinyurl.com/stfunub1
2http://tinyurl.com/stfunub2
3http://tinyurl.com/stfunub3
sourced decisions on them. In addition, we reveal important fea-
tures in predicting crowdsourced decisions. We demonstrate good
portability of our classifier across regions. Finally, we estimate the
practical implications of our approach, potential cost savings, and
victim protection.
We make several contributions. To the best of our knowledge,
we provide the first demonstration that toxic behavior, notoriously
difficult to objectively define, can be detected by a supervised clas-
sifier trained with large-scale crowdsourced data. Next, we show
that we can successfully discriminate behavior that is overwhelm-
ingly deemed innocent by human reviewers. We also identify sev-
eral factors which are used for the decision making in the Tribunal.
We show that psychological measures of linguistic “goodness” suc-
cessfully quantify the tone of chats in online gaming. Finally, we
apply our models to different regions of the world, which have
different characteristics in how toxic behavior is exhibited and re-
sponded to, finding common elements across cultures.
In Section 2 we give background on LoL and its crowdsourced
solution for dealing with toxic behavior. In Section 3 we review
previous literature. In Section 4 we provide details on our dataset.
In Section 5 we outline our research goals. In Section 6 we explain
features extracted from in-game performance, user reports, and lin-
guistic signatures based on chat logs. In Section 7 we build several
models using these features. In Section 8 we propose a supervised
learner and present test results. In Section 9, we discuss practi-
cal implications and future research directions, and we conclude in
Section 10.
2. BACKGROUND
To help readers who are unfamiliar with LoL, we briefly intro-
duce its basic gameplay mechanisms, toxic playing in LoL, and the
Tribunal system.
2.1 League of Legends
LoL is a match-based team competition game. Teams are most
often composed of five players who are randomly matched together,
and friends can also form pre-made teams.
LoL features a symmetric map with three paths, or “lanes”. The
lanes are colloquially known as “top”, “mid”, and “bot” and have
a “jungle” area between them. The goal of LoL is to penetrate the
enemy team’s central base, or “Nexus”, and destroy it. To destroy
the Nexus, players must first destroy towers in at least one lane.
Typically, when a match starts players choose to go to one particu-
lar lane, often taking on different roles depending on the character
they chose to play.
Players’ in-game characters are called champions. Riot has re-
leased 115 champions as of September 2013. A weekly rotation
of 10 champions is offered to all players, but they can also be per-
manently purchased via points earned through play or real world
money. Each champion has different strengths and thus naturally
lend themselves to the different styles of play expected from a par-
ticular lane.
2.2 Reporting Toxic Players
After a match, players can report toxic players in one of 10
predefined categories: assisting enemy team, intentional feeding,
offensive language, verbal abuse, negative attitude, inappropriate
[handle] name, spamming, unskilled player, refusing to communi-
cate with team, and leaving the game/AFK [away from keyboard].
Intentional feeding indicates that a player allowed themselves to
be killed by the opposing team on purpose, and leaving the game
is doing nothing but staying at the base for the entire game. To un-
derstand the motivation behind intentional feeding and assisting the
enemy team, we present a common scenario when such toxic play
happens. LoL matches do not have a time limit, instead continuing
until one team’s Nexus is destroyed. If a team is at a disadvantage,
real or perceived, at some point during the match, they may give
up by voting to surrender. However, surrendering is allowed only
after 20 minutes have passed, and the vote requires at least four af-
firmatives to pass. If a surrender vote fails, players who voted for
the surrender may lose interest and regard continuing the game as
wasting time. Some of these players exhibit extreme behavior in
response to the failed vote, such as leaving the game/AFK, inten-
tional feeding, or assisting the enemy. Leaving the game is particu-
larly painful since being down even one player greatly reduces the
chance of a “come from behind” victory. In other online games,
leaving is not typically categorized as a toxic because it usually
does not harm other players in such a catastrophic manner.
2.3 LoL Tribunal
To take the subjective perception of toxic behavior into account,
Riot developed a crowdsourcing system to judge whether reported
players should be punished, called the Tribunal. The verdict is de-
termined by majority votes.
When a player is reported hundreds of times over dozens of
matches, the reported player is brought to the Tribunal4. Riot ran-
domly selects at most five reported matches5 and aggregates them
as a single case. In other words, one case includes up to 5 matches.
Cases include detailed information for each match, such as the re-
sult of the match, reason and comments from reports, the entire chat
log during the match, and the scoreboard, that reviewers use to de-
cide whether that toxic player should be pardoned or punished. To
protect privacy, players’ handles are removed in the Tribunal, and
no information about social connections are available. We note that
our dataset does not include reports of unskilled player, refusing to
communicate with team, and leaving the game in our datasets, even
though players are able to choose from the full set of 10 predefined
categories6.
The Tribunal also institutes mechanisms to maintain the quality
of reviewers’ tasks. One is a limit on the number of cases that
reviewers can see a day. Next is a minimum duration for decision
making, limiting mechanical clicks without careful consideration.
Another is a skip feature for difficult cases.
After some time has passed, reviewers can see the final crowd-
sourced decisions for the cases they reviewed as well as the level of
agreement (majority, strong majority, or overwhelming majority).
To encourage user participation, Riot adopts reviewers’ accuracy
score and ranking as gamification element.
3. RELATED WORK
3.1 Toxic Playing in Online Games
Toxic behavior in online games is a form of cyberbullying, de-
fined as repetitive intentional behavior to harm others through elec-
tronic channels [34]. Computer-mediated-communication through
electronic channels without face-to-face communication lacks so-
cial psychological influences and can lead to more hostile interac-
tion [16]. In psychology and education, offline bullying has been
actively researched [29], and offers a theoretical background to un-
derstand cyberbullying.
4http://tinyurl.com/stfunub4
5http://tinyurl.com/stfunub5
6To the best of our knowledge, this is intentional on the part of
Riot.
Griefing is a term describing cyberbullying in online gaming, and
those who enjoy the act of disrupting other players are called grief
players (“griefers”) [10, 25]. Griefers make other players annoyed
and feel fatigued. Sometimes victims even leave the game [27],
exhibiting toxic behavior themselves to escape beratement.
Although griefing is intuitively understood, its boundary is un-
clear [7, 10, 23, 27] because customs, rules, or ethics can be differ-
ent across games [41]. In addition, the perception of grief behavior
is unique across individuals. As a consequence, even griefers them-
selves may not recognize what they have done as griefing [23]. This
inherent vagueness makes it hard to understand grief behavior.
A few studies have characterized grief playing. Foo and Koivisto
divide grief behavior into four categories: harassment, power impo-
sition, scamming, and greed play [10]. They focus on the intention
of behavior and distinguish griefing from greed playing because
motivation behind greed playing is usually for the win instead of
disrupting other players. Barnett discovers that griefing is one of
factors provoking anger in World of Warcraft by survey of 33 par-
ticipants [1]. Chen et al. correlate personality and grief playing.
They reveal that players who enjoy the anonymous experience tend
to like the motivation of grief playing, such as “I like the experience
of wanting to feel powerful while playing online games” [6].
3.2 Challenges in Crowdsourcing
While crowdsourcing, coined by Jeff Howe [17], has had huge
impacts on a variety of areas, such as answering queries [12], as-
sessing visual design [15], translating texts [43], conducting user
studies [20], and collecting disaster responses [14], inherent noise
in outcomes by laborers has received much attention [18, 30]. This
issue is not limited to amateur labor groups. Voorhees demon-
strate that even experts show low levels of agreement on subjective
problems, such as judging the relevance of documents to a given
topic [40].
Majority votes or overlapping labels are popular methods to im-
prove the overall quality of error-prone labelers. Nowak and Rüger
demonstrate that majority voting on crowdsourcing is able to fil-
ter noisy judgments and to improve the quality of experts’ anno-
tations [28]. Sheng et al. investigate how overlapping labels for
low agreement tasks improve quality, especially when labelers are
imperfect [33]. They find that a selective repeated-labeling strat-
egy can improve data quality substantially. Some studies benefit
from maximizing the utility of more expert workers. Snow et al.
propose giving different weights to each labeler based on how their
accuracies improve the label quality [35].
Crowdsourcing has been widely used for producing ground-truth
labels for data-driven machine learning, such as labeling sentiment
in social media [5]. To obtain more accurate classifiers from crowd-
sourced labels with noise, Brew et al. report that a classifier with
training sets only from labelers showing high agreement achieves
better accuracy than with less agreement [5]. Also, Kumar and
Lease show that incorporating the accuracies of each labeler has a
large impact on the overall accuracy of a supervised learner [21].
Tang and Lease propose semi-supervised learning with many unla-
beled tasks but a small set of expert-labeled tasks [37].
Our approach, which regards supervised learning and crowd-
sourcing as complementary mechanisms to balance loads, is in-
spired by two recent systems: CrowdFlow and CrowdSynth. Quinn
et al. develop CrowdFlow [32], an integrated framework of human
efforts and machine learning classifiers, and discuss the efficiency
of the crowd-assisted machine learning [31]. As a sample appli-
cation, they first translate texts via Google Translate, and then let
experts identify problematic parts and offer alternatives. They do
not automatically identify difficult parts of texts but require man-
ual labor. Kamar et al. present a prototype of CrowdSynth [19]
to guide workers with predicting the labels in a well-known citizen
science application called Galaxy Zoo. Their models are derived
from relatively rich data, such as detailed records for labels, work-
ers, and combinations of them.
4. DATA COLLECTION
We developed distributed crawlers to collect over 1.46 million
cases in the Tribunal, made up of 10 million user reports. We
carefully designed our crawlers not to degrade the performance of
Riot’s web servers. In addition to the parsing time of the crawled
contents, we explicitly let our crawlers be idle for seconds before
the next request.
Riot divides the world into several regions, each served by dedi-
cated servers due to quality of service concerns. We collected data
from North America (NA), Western Europe (EUW), and South Ko-
rea (KR) servers by considering the representativeness of cultural
uniqueness and the familiarity of authors. We reasonably assume
most of the players connect to the servers in the region closest to
them for the best user experience.
As a result, in April 2013, we crawled all available cases from
the Tribunal of the each of the three regions. We summarize our
data collection in Table 1. We reiterate that a case includes multiple
matches, which in turn contain one or more reports.
EUW NA KR Total
Cases 649,419 590,311 220,614 1,460,344
Matches 2,841,906 2,107,522 1,066,618 6,016,046
Reports 5,559,968 3,441,557 1,898,433 10,899,958
Table 1: Data collection summary
5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
With our large-scale labeled data via crowdsourcing, we raise
two research questions.
RQ1: Can we predict the crowdsourced decisions?
Since the perception of toxic behavior is subjective and different
across individuals, the Tribunal deals with toxic behavior by a ma-
jority rule based on crowdsourcing. It has worked quite well, but
requires a long time to obtain enough votes. Our research question
is to validate whether a certain part of the Tribunal can be assisted
by machine learning. A few considerations are carefully addressed
here.
Defining machine learning tasks We can define various ma-
chine learning tasks on crowdsourced decisions in the Tribunal.
Classifying 6 different combinations of decision and level of agree-
ments, dividing cases into punished or pardoned, extracting high
agreement cases, and recognizing less agreement cases are all pos-
sible tasks that machine learning could help. It is not only about
the accuracy of the classifier but also about the application.
Refining training set A Tribunal decision is either punish
or pardon with a level of agreement: majority, strong majority,
and overwhelming majority. Previous literature demonstrate that
crowdsourced responses with high agreement are better for training
a classifier than less agreement [5]. Unfortunately, it is unknown
how Riot divides these levels of agreement. We thus create differ-
ent training sets and compare the accuracy of trained classifiers.
Using non-linguistic features only LoL has a global userbase
in a few tens of countries across the world. This implies that chat
logs in the Tribunal are not always written in English. For example,
most messages in the Korean Tribunal are written in Korean. Vari-
ous languages can potentially limit the portability of the classifier if
it largely depends on the textual information left in chats. In other
words, more non-linguistic features increase the generality of the
classifier and bring higher practical impacts.
Detecting sentiments in chats This is the inverse of the above,
maximizing the benefit of linguistic features. Many methods have
been developed for detecting sentiments conveyed in texts. Our
intuition is that negative sentiments might be captured from toxic
behavior or other players’ reaction when toxic playing occurs.
RQ2: What do the important features imply?
The next research goal is understanding decision-making in the
Tribunal from the important features observed through supervised
learning. Which features are important for predicting crowdsourced
decisions? What do they mean? Answering these questions leads
to several interesting challenges. First of all, features we find could
be a huge advance in online violence research. Toxic behavior has
been typically considered hard to define. If we obtain a good qual-
ity supervised-learned classifier, it indicates the important build-
ing blocks in defining and understanding toxic behavior. Then, we
draw a subsequent question. Can we apply our classifier or the
important features to other games, or Internet communities? If im-
portant features in our classifier are LoL-independent, the answer
to the question will be in the affirmative.
6. FEATURES
The Tribunal can be seen as a 2-stage crowdsourced solution.
Stage 1 is the per-match reporting done by players that actually ex-
perienced the alleged toxic behavior. Stage 2 is the Tribunal case-
by-case judgments. Toxicity is not having a bad game (possibly
perceived as feeding or assisting the enemy) or having a bad day
and lashing out at a teammate (harassment). According to Riot, a
certain threshold of reports from stage 1 must be met before mov-
ing on to stage 2, which reveals repeated toxic behavior. The rea-
son that stage 2 is necessary has to do with the vagueness of toxic
behavior. Consider a player who is not very skilled. This player
might exhibit tendencies that could be interpreted as toxic, for ex-
ample intentionally feeding. This is compounded by attribution
theory where a negative outcome (losing a match) triggers a search
for an external cause. I.e., when a team loses, as is the the case in
the majority of reported matches [22], reporters might attribute the
loss to a poorly performing player. Although there is an unskilled
player report type, players are aware that no punishment is handed
out for this category and thus might choose one of the punishable
offenses instead. Thus, the second stage removes the subjectivity
associated with direct interaction with the possibly toxic player, as
well as providing a more complete view of the accused’s behavior
over multiple matches. Players that have invested significant time,
and are thus familiar with LoL, are able to pick out patterns of toxic
behavior when reported matches are combined into a case.
The challenge lies in representing the parsimonious data pre-
sented to Tribunal reviewers in a form digestible by machine learn-
ing algorithms. We thus extract summarized statistics from each
Tribunal case. We make use of two primary sources of informa-
tion: 1) domain specific values extracted from the results of re-
ported matches, and 2) the information provided by the stage 1 Tri-
bunal participants.
There are, unfortunately, several points of variation when it comes
to extracting the in-game values. First, each case has a varying
amount of matches with no guarantee on the sequence in which the
matches took place. Second, because of the variety of game play
in LoL, there is no guarantee that matches are directly compara-
ble, especially across different players. For example, a player with
below average skill is likely to have a lower KDA (an in-game per-
formance metric explained in the next section) than a player with
higher skill. Now assume that the low skill player is not toxic, while
the high skill player is toxic, yet both are reported for intentional
feeding. There might not be a way of discriminating between the
two using just KDA.
Although we average the per-match statistics across all matches
with a given report type for each case, we could also use the worst/best
matches. This is somewhat problematic as it requires a definition
of worst and best. We include the standard deviation of each av-
eraged statistic as a feature, which provides a sense of inter-match
performance differences.
We then augment each instance with information provided by the
Stage 1 Tribunal participants. Namely, we make use of the num-
ber of allied and enemy reports in a given match, the number of
reports where the reporter included optional human readable text
about the offense, and the most common type of behavior reported
for a given match. For each possible report type, we compute the
relevant statistics across all matches in the case with said most com-
mon report type.
6.1 In-game Performance
In-game performance is the category of features that most re-
quires the input of experts. LoL is a complicated game and the
meaning of the various match-related statistics is unlikely to be
divined by a reviewer, especially with respect to toxic behavior,
without having investing a significant number of hours in game-
play themselves. Nevertheless, they are the richest and easiest fea-
tures to represent to a computer and so we extract a set of relevant
statistics from the matches in each Tribunal case.
We first begin with the most basic statistic, one that is common
to nearly all competitive games: kills, deaths, and assists. Kills and
deaths are relatively self-explanatory: simple counts of the number
of enemies a player killed and the number of times said player died.
Likewise, an assist is awarded to a player that participated in elim-
inating an enemy, but did not land the killing blow. The details of
what qualifies an assist varies per game, but LoL awards an assist
to any player that did damage or contributed passively (e.g., healed
a teammate that landed the killing blow) within 10 seconds prior to
the death of an enemy. Kills, deaths, and assist are raw scores, but
are often normalized to a KDA metric, defined as:
KDA =
kills+ assists
deaths+ 1
.
Unfortunately, due to the reliance on teamwork in games like
LoL, a single toxic player can severely impact his teammates abili-
ties to perform at a high level. For example, an intentional feeder is
supplying the enemy team with gold and experience points, allow-
ing them to acquire powerful items and abilities much faster than
the feeder’s allies. In turn, this can result in a low KDA not only
for the toxic player, but makes it difficult for his allies to main-
tain a good KDA as well. For this reason, it might be difficult
to distinguish toxic players based solely on KDA and our initial
analysis [22] indicated reviewers were not basing decisions only
on KDA. However, two other statistics, damage dealt and received,
might shed additional light on toxic players.
In LoL, attacks do a certain amount of base damage to other
players, removing a portion of their hit points (“life”). When a
player’s hit points reach 0, he dies, a kill (with associated gold and
experience) is awarded to his killers, and he must wait a certain
period of time to “respawn” and return to the fight. The base dam-
age is modified depending on various items that players purchase
during the match. Anecdotally, toxic players in the feeding and as-
sisting enemy categories will not buy items that aid in offense or
defense. Thus, we might expect a feeder to have very low damage
dealt and very high damage received relative to his teammates who
have made purchases of useful items; even though they might not
have the power to actually kill enemies (due to a gold and experi-
ence advantage given to the other team by the feeder), fair players’
efforts are likely to show in terms of damage. Seeing which items a
player bought could give more details, but it is overly specific and
loses generality.
Next, we include the total gold and gold per minute earned by the
offender. In LoL players earn gold in several ways: 1) passively at
a pre-determined rate, 2) destroying towers, 3) kills or assists, and
4) killing creeps, which are computer controlled monsters. Gold is
known to be a primary determinant of a match’s outcome.
The final performance related feature is time played, which is
useful for detecting leavers or players going AFK. In total, there
are 364 features generated from in-game performance values only.
This number is large because we group per-match values based on
the most common report type.
6.2 User reports
The first stage of the Tribunal, reports submitted players who di-
rectly observed the behavior, provides us with several pieces of in-
formation. First, we know the most common category of behavior
reported per match. Next, we know how many allies and enemies
made a report. Finally, reports can include a short (500 character
limit) comment from the reporter. Intuitively, the extra effort re-
quired to add a comment to a report might indicate the intensity of
the toxic behavior. Again, we group the per match values in the
case based on the common report type for that match, resulting in
a total of 28 features.
6.3 Chats
As seen in Figure 1, around 60% of cases have more than about
25% of the matches in them reported for offensive language or ver-
bal abuse. This indicates that the observed toxic behavior was ex-
pressed (at least partially) via the chat system. For this reason, we
intuit that the chat logs have predictive power. Linguistic analysis
is an area of intense research [11, 13, 38], and the corpus of chat
logs in our data set would provide an interesting case for cutting
edge techniques. We use an intuitive and straightforward method,
“happiness” index.
Happiness, and its relation to language, is a widely studied area
of psychology [2]. For example, in the Affective Norms for En-
glish Words (ANEW) study [4], participants graded a set of 1,034
words on a valence scale of 1 to 9 (in 0.5 increments). Valence is
the psychological term for the attractiveness (positive) or aversion
(negative) to something; in this case a word. In other words, va-
lence quantifies the “goodness” or “badness” of a word. Valence
scores in the ANEW dataset are well distributed, as can be seen in
Figure 2 (a), which plots the distribution of scores for all words in
the ANEW dataset.
The ANEW study polled both female and male respondents. Riot
reports that 90% of LoL players are male7, and we thus use male
respondent scores only. Although gender swapping often occurs in
social games [24], according to Flurry’s report8, action and strategy
are the top two genres that females usually avoid. Also, positive ef-
fects of gender swapping, enjoying a kind of “second” life, do not
apply to LoL.
7http://tinyurl.com/stfunub6
8http://tinyurl.com/stfunub7
Figure 2: CDF of valence scores.
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Figure 1: The number of matches reported in a case for each
category of toxic behavior per Tribunal case.
As demonstrated by Dodds and Danforth [9], valence scores for
individual words can be used to estimate the valence for a larger
corpus of text. The valence of a piece of text is defined as:
vtext =
∑n
i=1 vifi∑n
i=1 fi
, where vi is the valence score of the ith word from the ANEW
study, and fi is the number of times said word appears in a given
piece of text.
While we acknowledge that chat logs are likely to contain typos
and abbreviations, vtext has been shown to be robust across genres
of text, including tweets [9, 26], another medium where we might
expect “Internet-style” speech patterns. For cases where no ANEW
words were present, we define vtext = 0.
Figure 2 (b) plots the distribution of valence scores of all mes-
sages sent in a case for both pardoned and punished cases where
vtext ≥ 1. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms the
distributions are different. When compared to Figure 2 (a), we see
that “verbal” communication in LoL is generally neutral: most va-
lence scores fall between 5 and 6. Further, cases that resulted in a
punishment tend to have a lower valence score when compared to
pardoned cases. This indicates that the chat logs are likely to be
valuable in detecting toxic behavior.
When looking at the scores of messages sent only by potential
toxic players, offenders, in Figure 2 (c), it becomes clear that tox-
icity is present in a quantifiable way within the chat logs. The dis-
tributions for both punished and pardoned offenders is lower than
the valence of the entire chat logs. The mean for punished and par-
doned users are 5.725 and 5.779, respectively. Pardoned users are
indeed more likely to have higher valence scores. Interestingly, the
difference is mainly present in terms of “above average” (≥ 5) va-
lence scores for pardoned users as opposed to a tendency towards
below average scores for punished players. We also discover that
the difference between punished and pardoned offender becomes
bigger if more reviewers are agreed. Figure 2 (d) shows the valence
score of toxic players when overwhelming majority is agreed. The
mean for only those who are punished or pardoned in this case are
5.699 and 5.751, respectively.
In addition to the scores described above, we also include the
valence scores for bystanders and victims for each report category.
Here, we treat verbal abuse, offensive language, and negative at-
titude differently from the other categories. For these cases we
have previously observed that reports by enemies are much more
common. This can be attributed to bystander theory, which says
that bystanders, i.e., those not directly harmed by bad behavior, are
much less likely to take action against it. In the case of, e.g., in-
tentional feeding, not only are enemy teams not directly harmed by
the behavior, they actually receive a benefit. While the quality of
the competition may decrease, the odds of a win are much more in
their favor.
When it comes to chat based offenses, however, a toxic player
can lash out at everyone in the match. He can insult the enemy
team when they are performing well, and trash talk when they are
performing poorly. For example, a common insult in LoL is to call
someone a “noob,” slang for “newbie,” implying a lack of ability.
It is a catch-all negative term used as a response to criticism, to
call out poor play, as a form of trash talk, and just plain meanness.
The word “noob” appears 3,551,328 times in the chat logs for the
NA region; an average of 6 times per case and 1.7 times per match,
with players under review saying “noob” at more than double the
rate per message sent as non-offenders. Because these commu-
nication based categories can affect both enemies of the offender,
allies, or neither, we consider their victims to be the offender’s al-
lies if only allies reported him, enemies if only enemies reported,
and all players if both enemies and allies reported him.
With the above in mind, we extract 60 features per case from the
chat logs.
7. MODELS
As we introduced above, we extract features from different cate-
gories. We then build separate models for each category, and a full
model to contain all the features: an in-game performance model,
a user report model, a chat model, and a full model. The intuition
behind these basic models is comparing different sources.
First, in the in-game performance model, we can divide features
by offender performance and other players’ performance. Offender
performance can reflect intentional feeding. Players with notice-
ably bad performance might die over and over intentionally. We
note that non-toxic unintentional feeding does occur, but only in-
tentional feeding is toxic behavior. Since there is an unskilled
player Stage 1 report category that is unused in the Tribunal, we
ensure that our classifier is trained only on reviewers’ inference of
intention, and not a judgment of player skill. Other players’ perfor-
mance relates to the team competition aspect of LoL. Attribution
theory says that individuals will look for external causes of fail-
ure [42]. The most obvious cause would be poor performance by
an ally, and is likely to manifest as verbal abuse (harassment). In
other words, a toxic player might lash out at the worst perform-
ing ally due to the perception that a loss was the fault of said ally.
We hypothesize that the intensity of the verbal abuse, and thus
the likelihood of punishment in the Tribunal, increases as the of-
fender’s performance diverges from the worst performing player
on his team.
A less intuitive reasoning in favor of this model is that a poor per-
formance by a player does have an impact on the rest of his team.
Our previous analysis indicates that KDA alone is insufficient in
predicting the judgment of the tribunal: there was no correlation
with KDA and corresponding Tribunal decision [22]. I.e., players
with the best KDA were about as likely to be punished as those
with the worst.
The user report model depends on how players in a match per-
ceive toxic playing. Although user perception on toxic behavior is
different, more reports in a single match means more people rec-
ognize it, and implies more severe toxic behavior. In our initial
analysis [22], we find that the number of reports in a single match
is highly correlated with the likelihood of being punished.
The chat model deals with behavior that is expressed only via
communication; verbal abuse and offensive language. Addition-
ally, Tribunal reviewers can see the final in-game performance but
not how the match played out over time. Chats are thus the only
source to give reviewers context about what happened and what
other players thought about it.
8. RESULTS
8.1 Decision confidence and classifier training
We first answer whether or not reviewer agreement is relevant
when training a classifier. To do this, we grow forests from only
cases of a given agreement. We then evaluate each classifier with a
separate test set for each agreement. The intuition is that the cases
with the highest level of agreement from the reviewers display the
most egregious toxic behavior, providing a baseline for the remain-
der of cases.
Figure 3 plots the ROC curves for testing sets of each agree-
ment type with classifiers trained from varying agreement cases.
We observe that training the classifier with overwhelming majority
decisions results in the highest AUC across all cases. Our abil-
ity to distinguish between guilty and not guilty increases with the
level of agreement that we train the classifier with. This is con-
sistent with previous research [5]. While the classifier trained with
overwhelming majority is the most discriminating across the board,
Figure 4: [Best viewed in color.] ROC curve for predicting Tri-
bunal decisions with models using in-game performance (P),
user report (R), chats (C), and all available features (F).
training with strong majority cases has similar performance, while
performance drops off considerably when training with the major-
ity decision cases.
This experiment has several implications. First, it might be ben-
eficial to look at the extremes of behavior, clear cut pardons and
punishes, to better predict borderline cases. Second, it might be
fruitful to predict decisions based on confidence. I.e., finding the
most obviously guilty or innocent individuals, leaving the border-
line cases to human reviewers. Third, it reveals the difficulty in
discriminating between all but the most egregious offenses.
8.2 What are Tribunal decisions based on?
We now address what information Tribunal reviewers might be
basing their decision on. We present a few learning results to show
the performance of our Random Forest classifier.
We begin with the performance of predicting decisions, pardon
or punish without considering the agreement level. Figure 4 presents
ROC curve for predicting decisions, punish or pardon, by different
models. AUCs are 0.7187, 0.7195, 0.7157, and 0.7991 for the per-
formance, report, chat, and full models, respectively. We observe
that each model shows comparable performance.
Table 2 shows the 5 most important variables for predicting de-
cisions. Due to lack of space, we omit the important variables for
each category of toxic behavior, but it is similar across the cate-
gories.
In the performance model, we find that enemy performance is a
good predictor for decisions because offender or ally performance
is relative in team competition games. Also, offender performance
itself is important for decision making in the Tribunal. Interest-
ingly, the number of deaths is more important than KDA. This
might relate to partner blaming. A toxic player might blame team-
mates, e.g., saying “noob”, when he dies. The implication is the
toxic player died because allies did not help him. In this situation,
the number of deaths could be a good measure to reveal that the
toxic player performed poorly rather than his allies not helping out.
In the user report model, top variables are related to how many
reports are submitted. The more reports, the more likely the Tri-
bunal will decide to punish. This strongly agrees with our previous
analysis [22]. Additionally, we find that reviewers care about short
comments in user reports. This implies that a user interface en-
(a) Majority (b) Strong Majority (c) Overwhelming Majority
Figure 3: [Best viewed in color.] ROC curves for cases with a majority / strong majority / overwhelming majority decision using
classifier trained from majority cases (“M”), strong majority cases (“SM”), and overwhelming majority cases (“OM”)
Rank Feature
Performance only
1 verbal.abuse.enemies.kda
2 verbal.abuse.enemies.gpm
3 verbal.abuse.offender.deaths
4 verbal.abuse.enemies.kda.avg.per.player
5 verbal.abuse.offender.kda
Report only
1 verbal.abuse.allied.report.count
2 verbal.abuse.allied.report.comment.count
3 intentionally.feeding.allied.report.count
4 intentionally.feeding.allied.report.comment.count
5 offensive.language.allied.report.count
Chat only
1 case.offender.valence
2 verbal.abuse.offender.chat.msgs
3 offensive.language.offender.chat.msgs
4 verbal.abuse.offender.valence
5 verbal.abuse.total.chat.msgs
Full
1 case.offender.valence
2 verbal.abuse.allied.report.count
3 verbal.abuse.offender.chat.msgs
4 offensive.language.offender.chat.msgs
5 verbal.abuse.allied.report.comment.count
Table 2: The top 5 ranked features from an information gain
evaluator for Tribunal decisions.
couraging comments might be helpful for crowdsourced decision-
making.
In the chat model, we find that the most important variable is the
valence score of offender no matter what the reported toxic cate-
gory is. This agrees with our intuition that reviewers can see the
context from chats and infer what happened. They gain insights
from chat not only for verbal abuse or offensive language, but also
other categories of toxic behavior. Also, this demonstrates that the
ANEW dataset works well even with chats in online games. The
second and third most important variable are the number of mes-
sages sent by the offender when the reported reason is verbal abuse
and offensive language. This implies that the likelihood of toxic
behavior goes up if the offender talks more. This can be easily
recognized in real-time and thus pragmatically used for warning
toxic players through visual cues. The fourth important variable
is the valence score when the behavior is reported as verbal abuse.
This is straightforward to understand. We find that number of total
messages sent when the report reason is verbal abuse is the fifth
important variable. This is the only feature in the top five that is
not only related to the offender, but also others. If more players
are involved in a quarrel, it is a strong sign of verbal abuse having
occurred.
The top 5 features in the full model are entirely from the chat
and report models. The total valence of the case is the number
one feature, which highlights how much toxic behavior is visi-
ble/expressed via in-game communication. The second most im-
portant feature in the full model comes from the report only model,
highlighting how our approach dovetails with the first crowdsourced
stage of the Tribunal. The hints provided by those that directly ex-
perience toxic behavior are useful not only to human reviewers,
but, for an algorithmic solution as well. Next, we note that the 6th
and 7th most important features in the full model are from the per-
formance model. Thus, while in-game performance numbers are a
predictor of toxic behavior, context is key.
We also look into the top 5 important variables in predicting
overwhelming majority pardon and punish, respectively. Due to
lack of space, we omit the details but we highlight two findings by
comparing them. One is that there are great discrepancies of im-
portant variables between the model for predicting overwhelming
majority pardon and punish. It implies that reviewers might make a
decision for punish and pardon according to different mechanisms.
The other is that, similar to predicting decisions, there are some
commonalities in important variables across the category of toxic
behavior for predicting overwhelming majority pardon and pun-
ish. For example, in predicting overwhelming majority pardon, the
most important variable in the report only model is the number of
reports by allies across the category. Similarly, in predicting over-
whelming majority punish, the most important variable in the chat
only model is the number of messages sent by the offender across
the categories. Of course, there are some specifics for each cate-
gory. For predicting overwhelming majority punish, in the report
only model, the number of reports by enemies is more important
than the number by allies in intentional feeding, but in verbal abuse,
allies’ reports are more important than enemies’. For future work,
we intend to combine this result with qualitative user interviews and
plan to reveal details of the mechanism of reviewers’ decisions.
Figures 5 and 6 show ROC curves for predicting overwhelm-
ing pardon and overwhelming punish, respectively. Their AUC are
Figure 5: [Best viewed in color.] ROC curve for predicting
overwhelming pardon decisions with models using in-game per-
formance (P), user report (R), chats (C), and using all available
features (F)
Figure 6: [Best viewed in color.] ROC curve for predicting
overwhelming punish decisions with models using in-game per-
formance (P), user report (R), chats (C), and using all available
features (F)
0.8049, 0.8055, 0.8269, and 0.8811 for overwhelming pardon de-
cisions and 0.6509, 0.6886, 0.6190, and 0.7461 for overwhelming
punish decisions. There are some interesting differences between
the curves for the agreement levels. First, detecting overwhelm-
ing pardon is easier to find than overwhelming majority punish and
shows quite good performance. It is mainly because overwhelm-
ing majority punish is very close to strong majority punish, as we
mentioned in Figure 3.
This proves the feasibility of automatically assigning tasks to
crowds and machines according to their difficulties. Quinn et al.
demonstrate that crowd-assisted machine learning can achieve high
overall accuracy when assigning easy tasks to machine and fuzzy
tasks to human [32]. Although they divide cases into two classes
by human experts, our result demonstrates that we can do it auto-
matically.
Figure 7: [Best viewed in color.] ROC curve for EUW decisions
with classifier trained on NA.
In context of LoL, properly dealing with overwhelming pardon
case is more important than overwhelming punish. Wrongly pun-
ished players would leave LoL, while wrongly pardoned players
sometimes would be back to the Tribunal. If they do not come to
the Tribunal again, it means that they are reformed and fine for the
overall LoL ecosystem.
In addition, we achieve high accuracy to predict decisions of
punish or pardon on clear-cut cases, overwhelming majority punish
and pardon cases, as in Figure 3. Thus, it is feasible that our clas-
sifier can automatically extract clear-cut cases and make accurate
decisions on them. It is great way to assist crowdsourcing platform
by machine learning.
Second, the order of models by performance is different in two
cases. In detecting overwhelming majority pardon, we observe that
a chat model shows the best performance, while a user report model
is quite comparable for the most part. By contrast, in detecting
overwhelming majority punish, a user report model shows quite
good performance. This is an interesting finding. Reviewers need
to understand context from chats to prove not guilty, but they also
see why and how many times a toxic player is charged. This is con-
sistent with our initial analysis, revealing the number of user reports
is highly correlated with the likelihood of being punished [22].
8.3 Classifier portability
Finally, we explore whether or not our classifier is portable.
Based on previous analysis [22], we saw that there were statisti-
cally significant differences in Tribunal cases across the various
regions that LoL operates. One underlying reason behind this is
likely due to cultural differences realizing themselves both in the
tendencies of toxic players as well as the reviewers. Because of
these differences, we expect models trained on the North American
dataset to not perform as well on the other regions. However, we
do expect the models to remain superior to a coin flip in terms of
discriminatory power. In other words, while we believe the models
we specify are meaningful regardless of the region, the thresholds
learned are probably sub-optimal.
Before presenting results, we stress an additional caveat related
to linguistic features. The ANEW dataset is based on English words
and was built from American respondents. This makes the linguis-
tic features (highly relevant in the NA dataset) useless when ap-
plied to the KR dataset since English language words are almost
Figure 8: [Best viewed in color.] ROC curve for EUW Over-
whelming Majority Pardons with classifier trained on NA.
non-existent. The EUW dataset includes players with a variety of
native tongues, and anecdotally French, German, and Spanish are
all spoken in-game. However, there is no language requirement to
become a reviewer; you only have to have an account within the
region you are reviewing. Also, English is a common tongue for
gamers world wide. In fact, we see that less than 1% of EUW cases
have an undefined vtext.
Figures 7 and 8 show ROC curves of predicting EUW decisions
and detecting EUW overwhelming majority pardon cases by us-
ing classifier trained on NA. The performance of predicting EUW
decision does not reach that of NA decision, but detecting EUW
overwhelming majority pardon is as good as NA. As with our hy-
pothesis, this shows the potential of classifier portability, but at the
same time, the existence of regional differences [22].
9. DISCUSSION
9.1 Estimating the Real-world Impacts
We present the potential gain of time, cost, and accuracy if our
classifier assists the Tribunal. One challenge is estimating the ac-
tual cost, time, and accuracy of reviewing cases in the Tribunal
because Riot does not release detail statistics thereof, except a few
infographics. We collect and complement partially available infor-
mation to estimate required sources for the Tribunal.
First, we estimate the actual cost for crowdsourcing decisions.
Initially, Riot gave 5 Influence Points (IP) as rewards to each vote
only when a majority vote is reached, but have since removed this
payment system. In LoL, IP is used for buying champions or skins.
To measure how big 5 IP is, we need to convert it to real money.
Some champions whose price are 450 IP can also be bought for 260
Riot Points (RP), that can be purchased by real money. Players pay
$10 for 1380 RP. Through a simple calculation, we reach $0.02 for
each correct vote. This is comparable fare with other crowdsourc-
ing platforms [32].
Second, we estimate the time required for each case. According
to the talk by Jeffrey “Lyte” Lin at Game Developers Conference
(GDC) 20139, reviewers have cast 105 million votes and reformed
280,000 toxic players. Other announcements by Steve “Pendragon”
9http://tinyurl.com/stfunub8
Mescon10 reveal 50% of players warned by Tribunal are reformed.
We thus assume that 105 million votes make verdicts for 560,000
toxic players and half of them are reformed. We conservatively as-
sume this is the lower bound of players who came to the Tribunal.
This means that 187.5 votes are required for majority votes on a sin-
gle case. From the same source, Riot reveals more than 47 million
votes were cast in the first year of the Tribunal, implying that 1.49
votes per second are cast. From both, we can infer 125.85 seconds
are required to reach a verdict for one case in the Tribunal. We
reasonably assume that this is the acceptable speed where Riot’s
in-house experts manually review some intriguing cases.
Finally, we estimate the accuracy of the Tribunal. Lin said, “ap-
proximately 80% agreement between the [Tribunal] community and
Riot’s in-house team”, in the same GDC talk. He added that the in-
house team is less lenient than the Tribunal. Surprisingly, the over-
all accuracy of the Tribunal is comparable with our classifier with
respect to Riot’s in-house decisions. That is, in contrast to Crowd-
Flow [32], our supervised learner has the potential to replace the
crowdsourcing part of the Tribunal with no real sacrifice in accu-
racy.
We now estimate the gain of Riot from the view of cost and vic-
tim players.
Cost savings We already compute that the cost of each correct
vote is $0.02. Conservatively, we estimate 50% of all votes fall into
majority for each case. Since the Tribunal got 47 million votes the
first year, its cost is 47M (votes) x 50 (%) x 0.02 ($) = 470,000 ($).
As of March 2013, the number of votes reached 105 millions. Its
potential cost surpasses 1 million dollars. With the success of new
regions and a growing userbase, this cost will become huge.
Protecting victims As of October 2012, Riot announced that
12 million players play LoL everyday11 and they play more than 1
billion hours every month. Thus, we estimate that a player enjoys
LoL 83 minutes everyday which equates to 2.21 matches where
one match usually spans 30 to 45 minutes. In the first year, the Tri-
bunal detected 47M / 187.5 = 250,667 toxic players. On average,
686.75 toxic players are warned by the Tribunal everyday. From
this number we can compute number of potential victims who are
protected by the Tribunal everyday. The number of matches toxic
players participate everyday is 1,517.74, and 13,659.61 innocent
players are exposed to toxic players. If our classifier and the Tri-
bunal works together in a 50-50 manner, we can protect 13,659
more players everyday and more than 400 thousand per month.
9.2 Limitations and Consequences
Although we have shown our approach is relatively robust, even
across different regions of the world, there are some limitations.
First, although outside the scope of this paper, LoL features an ever
changing “meta-game” which dictates commonly used strategies
and tactics. Although the features we use in this paper are not di-
rectly tied to the meta, for example which particular items or cham-
pions are selected, they are indirectly related. E.g., the amount of
damage dealt and received or gold earned might be influenced by
the current meta. Although the datasets in this paper span multiple
metas and we still see good results, accuracy might be improved
by training classifiers on data only from the meta of cases under
examination. We also note that changes in meta only affect the
performance related features/models.
Toxic players could, in theory, adapt to avoid detection. For ex-
ample, toxic players might say “Wow, you are a great player!” sar-
castically instead of calling someone a noob. Or, perhaps an inten-
10http://tinyurl.com/stfunub9
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tional feeder would go out of his way to damage the enemy team,
but not enough to actually kill them. This raises some interesting
points. First, toxic behavior only has an impact if it actually affects
people in a negative way. It would take a major shift in the commu-
nity’s understanding of language to infer that a seemingly positive
statement was meant in a negative way.
Second, in the case of toxic players adapting their play style,
we argue that is a hidden benefit of our approach. Detecting toxic
behavior has significant value, but preventing it wholesale or reduc-
ing its impact is a much better solution. Although a feeder could
attempt to hide his intentions by damaging the enemy team, he is
consequently reducing the negative impact of his feeding by still
providing some utility to his team.
9.3 Future Research Directions
One interesting research direction is real-time detection of toxic
playing and adaptive interface design. Currently, the Tribunal deals
with toxic players after victims are exposed to online violence. We
quantitatively show that many people are exposed to toxic behavior
even though a relatively well designed crowdsourcing framework
to deal with toxic players is operating. Our suggestion is to protect
innocent players before they are exposed to toxic playing through
adaptive an user interface. Simply, we can warn toxic players when
they exhibit toxicity. Since toxic players sometimes do not recog-
nize what they did as toxic playing [23], some visual cues repre-
senting toxicity will be helpful to reform them.
As another psychological experiment, we are interested in whether
they can be treated by giving penalties within a game, such as de-
grading champion status in real time, when toxic playing is de-
tected. Since the competitive nature of LoL is the origin of some
toxic playing, in-game penalties might have an impact. The other
reason that this might work is due to the immediacy of punish-
ment. It is well known that instant punishment (reinforcement) is
more effective than delayed one [39]. Degrading champion status
or marking them visibly [3] as toxic players could serve as an in-
termediate, direct punishment, while warning by the Tribunal is a
delayed punishment. How toxic players react to this intermediate
punishment will be an interesting avenue of future research.
10. SUMMARY
In this paper we explored the use of crowdsourced decisions on
toxic behavior made by millions of experts. Using the same sparse
information available to the reviewers, we trained classifiers to de-
tect the presence, and severity of toxicity. We built several models
oriented around in-game performance, reports by victims of toxic
behavior, and linguistic features of chat messages. We found that
training with high agreement decisions resulted in more accuracy
on low agreement decisions and that our classifier was adept in
detecting clear cut innocence. Finally, we showed that our classi-
fier is relatively robust across cultural regions; our classifier built
from a North American dataset performed adequately on a Euro-
pean dataset.
Ultimately, our work can be used as a foundation for the further
study of toxic behavior. The features we found to be important can
serve as a spring board for more in depth learning. Further, a pre-
liminary cost analysis indicates that our classifier has the potential
to, at minimum, alleviate the some of the burden placed on human
reviewers.
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